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I. THE DEBT STRATEGY
The basic purpose of the "Program for Sustained Growth" pro-
posed by Secretary of the Treasury Baker in October of 1985 (also
called the Baker Plan) is to implement a practical debt strategy
recognizing both political and economic realities. It focuses on the
fundamental need for stronger growth in debtor nations as a pre-
requisite to solving the debt problem. Achieving strong growth and
long-term development requires economic reforms by debtor na-
tions to enable them to use domestic and external resources more
efficiently, and supportive financing by the international financial
institutions and the commercial banks.
The success of this strategy ultimately depends on the willingness
of the debtor nations to initiate their own growth-oriented reforms,
including both macroeconomic and structural elements. Most of the
major debtor nations face a number of fundamental problems that
need to be addressed in order to facilitate stronger growth and
development.
First, these debtor nations' economic policies have tended to de-
pend excessively on external borrowing. This has substantially in-
creased those countries' external debt, without improving their abil-
ity to service that debt. While some supplementing of domestic
savings with foreign financing is necessary for rapid growth, so is
avoiding increasing debt at a pace that exceeds the debtor coun-
tries' capacity to service that debt. Debtor countries must reduce
their dependence on foreign borrowing and enhance both domestic
savings and non-debt financial flows to foster stronger growth.
It is essential to ensure that confidence, as the domestic economy
improves, encourages new foreign direct investment and stimulates
the repatriation of flight capital. It is necessary to implement poli-
cies which assist in reducing inflation, assuring positive real interest
rates, and developing the domestic capital and financial markets. In
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addition, a more open investment climate and growth-oriented tax
reforms will facilitate renewed confidence. Only the debtor nations
themselves can create the economic conditions which attract new
capital. For them to succeed, they must make this a top priority.
Second, debtor nations need to shift their development strategies
toward a more externally-oriented approach. In much of Latin
America, for example, highly protective trade regimes and domestic
incentive systems have encouraged inefficient import substitution
and provided a bias against export growth. These policies have
skewed domestic resource allocation, insulated firms from interna-
tional competition, and reduced incentives to control costs and
innovate.
There is a need to stimulate more efficient allocation of resources
and increase production of competitive goods for domestic use and
export. This requires a process of liberalizing trade, more market-
oriented pricing, and setting realistic exchange rates. This should
be attempted in conjunction with development strategies in order to
improve investment productivity.
Third, large public sectors, ranging from 30% to 60% of the gross
national product in most Latin nations, have absorbed a substantial
share of domestic savings and investment. During the 1970s and
the early 1980s, the number of state-owned enterprises increased
dramatically. For example, in 1982 Mexico had more than a thou-
sand public sector enterprises. Such enterprises tend to be heavily
subsidized and contribute to large government deficits.
II. PROGRESS UNDERWAY
Despite the relatively short period that has passed since the debt
initiative was proposed, considerable progress has been made.
First, many debtors are already taking important steps toward
increasing savings and investment, improving their economic effi-
ciency, converting public enterprises to private enterprises, and en-
couraging the return of flight capital.
Second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has negotiated
new standby programs with eight out of fifteen major debtors since
October 1985, including new loan commitments of $4.7 billion.
Third, the World Bank has negotiated $2.9 billion in new policy-
based loans with ten major debtors, and is discussing nearly $5 bil-
lion in additional policy-based loans for the fifteen major debtors.
Aggregate World Bank loans to these debtors increased by 40%
during its 1986 fiscal year. A substantially larger share of loans are
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now based on structural policy reforms.
Finally, the commercial banks have agreed in principle to provide
$10.3 billion in new loans including a $7 billion package for Mex-
ico, a $320 million new money package for Nigeria, and a $220
million oil facility for Ecuador. The commercial banks have re-
scheduled nearly $110 billion in outstanding debts since October
1985. Other financing packages and rescheduling are also under
discussion.
All of this has been done while external forces have been condu-
cive to growth. International interest rates have declined by nearly
four percentage points since 1984, saving the major debtors over
$11 billion in interest payments annually. Recent fluctuations in the
exchange rates among the major currencies should improve the ex-
port potential of debtors vis-h-vis countries with appreciating cur-
rencies. Furthermore, efforts are under way to achieve stronger
growth in other industrial nations, and to open global markets
through the new multilateral trade negotiations. Both should con-
tribute to stronger markets for debtor nations' exports.
Progress in the United States economy may herald improvement
for the others. The United States economic expansion is extending
into its fifth year, exceeding in duration five of the previous seven
expansions. There is every indication that it will continue unabated
through 1987 and beyond. Inflation has decreased drastically since
the early 1980s (with 1986 having the lowest rates than any year in
more than two decades). Employment increased by 2.5 million jobs
in 1986, and the prime interest rate declined by two full percentage
points during the year.
These figures reflect solid economic performance, and should set
the stage for a year of increased real economic growth and employ-
ment in 1987. Indeed, real growth is expected to average 3.25%
during this year, one percentage point higher than the 1986 aver-
age. This should additionally benefit developing countries, support-
ing their efforts to achieve stronger growth under the debt strategy.
III. THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC PROGRAM
The Mexican program fits squarely within the overall debt initia-
tive, and provides an excellent example of those countries that are
moving toward less government-directed, more market-oriented
economies as a prerequisite to stronger growth. The Mexican pro-
gram is based on a comprehensive three-year economic plan devel-
oped by the Mexicans. The plan is supported by a $1.5 billion
1987]
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growth-oriented IMF standby program. This program exists in con-
junction with $2.7 billion in net new disbursements by the World
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, in support of struc-
tural reforms, and with a $7 billion new money package by com-
mercial banks. The Mexican program includes a number of impor-
tant structural reforms, which require detailed discussion.
IV. PRIVATIZATION
The current Mexican government recognizes that reducing the
role of the public sector in the Mexican economy is necessary for
revitalizing, increasing efficiency, and enabling it to compete inter-
nationally. The government, therefore, has set the target of reduc-
ing the number of public companies from 1155 (in 1982) to 500 by
the end of 1988. By mid 1986, the Mexican authorities had author-
ized reductions in the number of parastatals to 697 through sales,
transfers or mergers. This was no easy task. For example, the liqui-
dation of a steel mill in Monterrey resulted in a sizeable number of
workers being displaced.
Unfortunately, the reduction in the number of parastatals has
not proportionately impacted on the budget. About 75% of paras-
tatal subsidies are concentrated in three entities-the Agriculture
Marketing Agency, the Federal Electric Company and the Mexi-
can Fertilizer Company. This concentration is one area of the fed-
eral budget where the Mexican government expects to make more
progress in the future.
V. TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Mexico has also made progress in increasing the international com-
petitiveness of its economy. Of key importance was the decision to
join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As part
of its accession to GATT, Mexico has undertaken significant trade
liberalization measures, replacing licenses with tariffs for all but
436 of its import items and reducing tariffs on over 4,000 import
items. Mexico has also announced new export promotion measures
consisting of tax rebates, credit facilities, relaxation of exchange
controls, and automatic approval of imports to be used in produc-
tion for export.
In support of these trade liberalizing measures, Mexico has re-
ceived a World Bank trade policy loan for $500 million. Additional
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VI. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Mexico has also made progress in one area that received consid-
erable criticism in the past-foreign investment. During the past
year, the Mexican government has begun applying its foreign in-
vestment law more liberally, realizing that relying mainly on exter-
nal borrowing to finance economic development puts too heavy a
burden on the economy. The government has reduced red tape for
foreign investors trying to receive approval to purchase Mexican
equities; more applications have been approved. For example, IBM,
Hewlett-Packard, and Honda have received permission to establish
100%-owned subsidiaries. Recently, the government also introduced
changes in its intellectual property law, which have partially satis-
fied United States Government demands for patent protection.
Finally, in the sensitive pharmaceutical area, the Mexican gov-
ernment has agreed to provide full patent protection for production
processes phased in over ten years, and has made changes in ge-
neric labeling requirements. Additionally, the government has
pledged non-discriminating marketing rights to non-Mexican firms.
Nevertheless, in this area as in others, there is concern about the
use of local content and export performance requirements. Further
progress should be made to reduce impediments to foreign
investment.
VII. DEBT/EQUITY SWAPS
Closely linked to promotion of foreign investment is a new Mexi-
can policy permitting debt/equity swaps. Under these provisions,
foreign investors who have purchased Mexican government foreign
debt obligations (mainly from commercial banks at a substantial
discount) can exchange these debt instruments for pesos at the
Central Bank for nearly the original peso value of the debt. A simi-
lar program in Chile is considered to have contributed to an expan-
sion of foreign investment inflow there.
The swap program in Mexico encourages tourism investments or
export-oriented industries that will expand foreign exchange earn-
ings. Working capital and the purchase of imported goods cannot
be financed through swaps because such transactions are not per-
manent additions to Mexico's capital stock.
The biggest attraction of debt/equity swaps could be for resi-
dents who take advantage of the discount on Mexican debt instru-
ments to repatriate some of the vast sums of money and liquid in-
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vestments held abroad. Current regulations also exclude foreign
portfolio investors from using swaps to purchase Mexican financial
assets.
Nevertheless, between May 1986 and mid-January 1987, the
Mexican government retired almost $520 million in public sector
debt under its program for substituting public sector debt with in-
vestment. The auto industry has dominated the debt/equity swap
program with $340 million equivalent in peso disbursements.
Chrysler's was the largest swap at $110 million, while Ford has had
a $50 million swap. In total, 130 applications for swaps were re-
ceived and 60 have been approved so far. Reportedly 70 debt/eq-
uity swap applications were received in January 1987 alone, verify-
ing the popularity of the program. The Mexican government
estimates that $660 million in private sector debt was converted
into equity in Mexican debtor companies in 1986.
The potential of the debt/equity swap facility as an instrument
for encouraging foreign capital inflows is considerable. The poten-
tial for this result is considerable, as has clearly been demonstrated
in Chile and other countries. According to the Mexican govern-
ment, however, the swaps' impact on the country's $100 billion plus
debt service burden is marginal. Apparently, the program's infla-
tionary impact was considerable causing the government of Mexico
to suspend it in early November 1987. The program is expected to
resume at reduced levels.
CONCLUSION
The debt strategy, economic program, privatization, trade liber-
alization, and foreign investment are some of the areas where the
Mexican Government has made recent progress in its overall effort
to improve the efficiency of the economy. The task has not been
easy, nor is it complete. Much remains to be done, and the govern-
ment is committed to continue the effort.
When one reads about Mexico in the United States press, the
focus is usually on what is wrong with the Mexican economy.
While Americans recognize that Mexico's economic problems are
not fully resolved, we are also concerned that, regarding Mexico,
we are quick to criticize and slow to praise. Mexico needs our sup-
port to achieve stronger economic growth and to improve the qual-
ity of life for its citizens. We must provide that support for a grow-
ing Mexican economy. It is in their interest as well as our own.
For the debt strategy to succeed, it is essential that all of the
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following elements be met:
First, industrial nations must maintain sufficiently strong growth
in their own economies, and they must provide access to their mar-
kets for developing nations' exports. Trade protectionism can only
hurt everyone.
Second, the commercial banks must do their part in providing
new loans to the debtor nations, and must resolve among them-
selves any differences about base periods for new loans, exit vehi-
cles for those who want to stop lending, and similar issues.
Third, it is essential to maintain creditor nations' and United
States Congressional support for multilateral development banks.
In addition, it is important for the United States to restore quickly
its funding shortfalls to the multilateral development banks. If
these shortfalls continue, our allies might conclude that we are not
committed to these organizations. Such an unwarranted conclusion
would adversely affect the ability of the United States to continue
to exercise leadership in the multilateral development banks and in
the broader international economic arena. This would, in turn, limit
the effectiveness of United States action to achieve crucial foreign
policy objectives.
Finally, the debtor nations themselves must maintain the pro-
gress now under way by continuing their efforts to improve their
growth prospects through additional reforms at home.
With patience, sensitivity, and mutual effort in all of these areas,
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